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H.: Mines and Minerals--Mining Rights Determined by Construction of D

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
committed a breach of contract. Risk of such hinderance as
has occurred was assumed by A. If B's purpose in making other
purchases was to corner the market or otherwise hinder performance in ways or for purposes not within the risk assumed
he would have committed a breach."
As large and as complicated as our system of government agencies is today, it would be difficult to imagine that a contract with
one agency should alter contractual liabilities on other projects of all
such agencies within a specified area. Such activity by other agencies ought to be a risk that is assumed as is normal competition on
the commercial market. If there is an assumption of uch a risk, then
the act creating the competition for the labor supply is not a breach.
The majority of the court in the principal case, however, does
not consider the act of the government in raising prevailing wages in
the area as the breach for which it would grant a right to compensation for extra costs. The majority feels that it was the obligation
of the government agency to disclose any material information at
the time of making the contract relating to the cost of performance
and that failure to inform the contractor of an impending future contract was a breach of the implied condition.
As mentioned by the dissenting opinion, the majority of the
court in the principal case has cited no cases, and this writer can find
none, that hold one party to a contract must disclose information
to a prospective bidder relating to another and different contract
which might cause competiton in the labor market.
As the dissenting opinion states, it is not a breach when one
creates a competitive situation and it does not seem that it could
be a breach for merely failing to disclose that which one is allowed
to do by law.
M. J. F.
MAn;s & MmmLALs-MNNG RxcHrs DEr flm
BY CONSmRUCTioN oF DEE-CoMmoN MnmiN PRACcE AT TimE AND PLACE OF

m Dxm.-In an action for damages, P alleged that
D's auger mining was unauthorized by deeds under which D was
conducting mining operations on P's land. One of the deeds to the
minerals under which D claimed granted the right to remove the
minerals in the most approved method, and another deed under
which D claimed reserved all minerals, together with all necessary
and useful rights for the proper mining thereof. Held, that the lanEXECUION OF
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guage of the deeds should be interpreted as of the time when, and
the place where, they were made. Since these deeds were made
between 1904 and 1907, and auger mining was not accepted as a
common practice, in the county where the land was situated, until
almost fifty years thereafter, D had no right by these deeds to engage
in auger mining upon such land. Brown v. Crozer Coal Co., 107
S.E.2d 777 (W. Va. 1959).
The principal case follows the earlier case of West VirginiaPittsburghCoal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947),
where the court held that similar deeds did not grant the right to
strip mine when such was not common practice in the locale at the
time of the grant. The court in the principal case drew an analogy
between strip and auger mining, and applied the same rule laid
down by the earlier case. Both these decisions have left some questions in the field of strip and auger mining unanswered. Indeed,
as pointed out in DoNlE=, CoAL Om & GAs iN WEST VmGnuA AN
Vmnum, § 144 (1951), the law of strip mining in West Virginia is
still in the process of development. Judge Donley indicates that the
result reached in West Virginia-PittsburghCoal Co. v. Strong, supra,
while it may be correct upon its facts, still it failed to consider the
principle that a deed is to be construed most strongly against the
grantor. However, this comment deals more with the reasoning
behind, and the practical aspects of, these two cases, and with the
possibility that as a practical result these holdings could perhaps give
rise to results contra to the judicialintent of the court.
As aforementioned, the West Virginia court in the principal case
followed the holding in the Strong case. The Strong case is the
judicial basis for Orestav. Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d
622 (1952), which arrived at a similar holding, and upon which the
court in the principal case also relied. In the Strong case the only
authority cited by the court for the principles which it enunciated
was Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick and Tile Co., 83
W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684 (1918), which held that the intention of
the parties to the extent of the minerals grant is to be determined
by the language of the mining rights and such grant limited to such
minerals as are ordinarily produced by the exercise of such mining
rights granted by the deed. Since the deed in that case granted
the minerals, it was necessary for the court to determine whether
or not clay on the surface was a "mineral" under such a grant. The
court said that minerals in that instance would be those ordinarily
obtainable by tunneling and shafting and therefore clay was not
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granted. The court went further and conceded that as far as minerals went, manganese and other ores are found upon the surface
and are often secured without quarrying or mining, and that it
could not be properly contended that such ores when so found are
not minerals, but when secured by the process of tunneling or
similar processes are minerals. By implication, the court seemed
to say that such minerals would have been granted even if they
were to be mined on the surface.
]:n the Strong case the court said that certainly if the owner of
the surface had a proprietary right to subjacent support, then he
likewise had an equal right to keep intact that which is to be supported, viz the surface. The court added that, as a matter of course,
there could be no right to the preservation of something that another
person has a superior right to destroy.
In the grant in the Strong case "all" the coal was granted along
with -the right to mine and remove "all" the coal. Such a grant would
constitute a waiver of subjacent support under the rule of Griffin
v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24 (1905). This was
a case in which the grantor sold "all" the coal together with the right
to enter and remove "all" the coal. The court acknowledged that
when the owner grants or leases the coal or minerals underlying the
surface of his land, he has the right of subjacent support unless he
has expressly or impliedly waived such right. But, the court held
that the use of the word "all", in modifying the word "coal" in both
the mining and the granting clauses, was a sufficient implication
that the grantor had waived his right to subjacent support. Although the more modem cases of Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
134 W. Va. 400, 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950); Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co.,
134 W. Va. 387, 59 S.E.2d 655 (1950); Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke
Co., 89 W. Va. 55, 108 S.E. 491 (1921), have expressly refused
to extend the rule of Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., supra, it has
become a rule of property in this state. Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke
Co., 113 W. Va. 309, 167 S.E. 737 (1933). Had the principles in
the Griffin case been applied, the Strong case would seem to contradict itself, there would be no right of preservation of the overburden or surface, but it could not be destroyed by strip mining.
The Strong case, therefore, presents the question of whether the
lessee or grantee of the coal rights in such a case might be allowed
to enter and remove the coal so that the surface might subside due
to lack of subjacent support, where the grantee would be prohibited
from strip mining. It is obvious that where the surface sinks because
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of lack of proper subjacent support, the land may be as useless
as if the overburden had been removed. If, in such a case, the
grantee of the coal rights were allowed to remove the subjacent
support, but not allowed to strip mine, the owner of the surface
would lose the statutory protection given him where there is strip
mining done on his land. The West Virginia Code provides that any
person strip mining land must give a penalty bond of $500 per acre,
and if he fails to regrade and replant the area, the bond is forfeited.
The landowner may get the benefit of these bonds to recondition his
land after any default of the strip miner. W. VA. CODE, ch. 22, art.
2A, §§ 3-5 (Michie Supp. 1959). It is interesting to note that the
court in the principal case drew an analogy between strip and auger
mining, and made reference to the fact that a similar bond was required for auger mining, the statute was amended by Chapter 99,
Acts of the Legislature, 1959, so that its provisions apply only to
surface mining. Deep mining and auger mining are now specifically
excluded.
Judge Fox, who dissented in the Strong case, felt that the
majority of the court were denying the grantee the right to all

the coal, which right had in fact been expressly granted to the
grantee. An instrument must be construed by the apparent intention
of the parties when the contract was formed. Babcock Coal & Coke
Co. v. Brackens Creek Coal Land Co., 128 W. Va. 676, 37 S.E.2d
519 (1946). If a party, as in the principal case, grants "all minerals"
along with the right to use all land necessary for the removal of all
minerals, it is felt that the parties intended for the surface to be
destroyed if necessary, especially where the minerals lay in rather
rough country. The decision in the principal case that a deed is to
be construed as of the time when it was made in the county where
the land lies may inhibit the use of newer mechanical means in mining, because such developments were not conceived or forseen years
beforehand when the deed of severance was made. Auger mining is
a new method of mining, corresponding to the act of a man drilling
a hole in a tree, with a small part of the tree cut away to give the
drill support. It is the author's opinion that auger mining and strip
mining are not analogous.
The Pennsylvania court has considered this problem, particularly in regard to strip mining, on various occasions. The more
recent cases indicate that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
undertaken to consider each case individually, looking to the sur-
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rounding circumstances to determine whether stripping should be
allowed. In Mount Carmel R. Co. v. M. A. Hanna Co., 371 Pa. 282,
89 A.2d 508 (1952), where there was a grant in 1891 with a right
to mine the coal by any method, it was held that the grantee had
the right to strip mine even though such method was not in common
usage at that time. A year later the same court said in Rochez Bros.,
Inc. v. Durica,374 Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953), that language which
was particularly applicable to underground mining did not include
the right to strip mine. The apparent conflict in these two cases
was D3solved in Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin,376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d
893 (1954). This case reviewed a number of Pennsylvania decisions
on the right of a grantee to strip mine under a deed of severance
made at a time when such was not the common practice. The court
said that the subject matter had to be considered along with other
surrounding circumstances. The Durica case was distinguished on
the ground that the land in question there was rich agricultural and
farm land, while the land in Mount Carmel R. Co. v. M. A. Hanna
Co., su.pra, and in the case then under consideration lay in rough
terrain. The Pennsylvania court felt that the cases were perfectly
reconcilable on that basis.
It is the author's opinion that some sort of subjective standard, as used above, should be applied in West Virginia, especially
in cases where strip or auger mining would be the only feasible
and economical method of removing the coal. Such a standard
would not be a panacea, but it might come closer to effectuating the
original intent of the parties.
L. O. H.
PaoPERTY-TENANCY By ENTmEIES CRTEION TkRoucH SImI.LTANEOUS CorVEYANCES INVOLVING TENANTs IN COMMON.-P, holder

of inchoate dower right in spouse's undivided interest in land as a
tenant in common with his mother, joined with spouse, D1 in conveyance of this interest to his mother, D2, which conveyance vested
her as sole owner of the fee in the entire tract. In the second part
of this transaction, D2 conveyed a portion of the tract to P and D1.
P divorced and remarried, brought this suit for partition; she sued
as a tenant in common. The trial court held that, although D, intended to create a tenancy by the entireties as between himself and
P, such instrument did not create that estate, and that the P was not
a tenant in common subsequent to her divorce, and P had no
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